Abstract It has recently been recommended that a shift from traditional flood prevention to more adaptive strategies is made, focusing on the reduction in and recovery from flood impacts as a means to improve resilience to climate impacts. This shift has had implications for the public-private divide in adaptive flood risk governance. In an urban context, it means that private actors such as developers and residents come into play, necessitating governance arrangements which cross the public-private divide. The division of responsibilities for water safety between the public and private sectors affects the way legitimacy is gained for these arrangements and raises new legitimacy issues. The paper offers an analysis of public and private responsibilities in adaptive flood risk governance arrangements, as well as of the legitimacy of the arrangements in the light of the public-private divide. A comparative case study is presented for three urban regeneration projects in un-embanked areas in Hamburg, Germany, Helsinki, Finland, and Rotterdam, the Netherlands, where adaptive strategies have been applied. The results show that network arrangements with joint publicprivate responsibilities use direct forms of participation and deliberation, but that these do not necessarily lead to more legitimate arrangements in the eyes of stakeholders as is often suggested in the literature. Both network and more public hierarchical arrangements can be perceived as quite legitimate under certain conditions.
Introduction
In the governance of adaptation to climate change, an adaptive approach is favoured by scientists and policymakers (e.g. Adger et al. 2005; IPCC 2007 ). This approach aims at preparing society to deal with and recover from the impacts of climate change, rather than merely trying to resist those impacts. In flood risk management, a similar adaptive approach has been gaining ground. While traditional flood management is focused on controlling and fighting water, an adaptive flood risk governance approach is meant to accommodate water through strategies such as 'space for the rivers' and 'managed retreat' to reduce the impacts of floods (e.g. Van Herk et al. 2011; Nye et al. 2011; Schelfaut et al. 2011; Vinet 2008) . Adaptive strategies are promoted in addition to flood prevention as a means to adapt to increased river discharge levels and to sea-level rise from climate change. In the urban planning context, it entails adaptive measures such as the wet-and dry-proofing of buildings, and recovery measures such as flood insurance programs and evacuation routes and plans. The broadening of strategies has had implications for the public-private divide in the governance of flood risk (Butler and Pidgeon 2011; Watson et al. 2009; Gersonius et al. 2008; Meijerink and Dicke 2008) . In many countries, traditional flood prevention is the responsibility of public water authorities, since most defence measures are regarded as public goods from which all people benefit. Adaptive flood risk governance (further abbreviated as AFRG) requires not only the involvement of public actors from other policy sectors (most deeply with land-use planning, e.g. Wheater and Evans 2009; Kokx and Spit 2012) , but it also means that private actors such as developers, insurance companies, housing corporations and residents gain certain responsibilities for flood risk governance.
It is commonly recognized that the shift from government to governance raises legitimacy issues (Bekkers and Edwards 2007; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2004) . The legitimacy of governance arrangements beyond the state has become an important field of scientific study, given their presumed democratic deficit (e.g. Biermann and Gupta 2011; Dingwerth 2007) . There are various interpretations of legitimacy stemming from different scientific disciplines (for an overview, see Bekkers and Edwards 2007) . For this study, we regard legitimacy as the acceptance of authority and justification of political power (Bernstein 2005; Biermann and Gupta 2011; Dingwerth 2007 ). In the case of AFRG, the acceptance of authority is no longer (exclusively) achieved through public responsibilities ratified through a classical representative democracy (van Buuren et al. 2012; Behagel and Turnhout 2011) . The allocation of certain responsibilities to private actors leads to other sources of legitimacy (e.g. direct representation) and raises new legitimacy issues (e.g. skewed interest representation). This paper deals with the question of how legitimacy is gained for AFRG arrangements in terms of their decisionmaking process and outcomes, and how differences in legitimacy can be explained in terms of differences in the divisions of responsibilities between public and private actors. However, much literature on the public-private divide in climate adaptation, as well as on the legitimacy of governance arrangements for climate adaptation, is still of a conceptual nature (e.g. Aakre and Rübbelke 2010; Osberghaus et al. 2010; Mendelsohn 2006; Paavola and Adger 2006; Hulme et al. 2007) . Our research has an empirical focus. It aims to generate knowledge on climate adaptation practice at the local level by studying the governance arrangements for three urban regeneration projects that use multiple flood risk strategies for adapting to climate change. Many cities have waterfront development projects, turning former harbour areas into high-quality residential and office areas (Priemus and Davoudi 2012) . These represent an interesting case study, since often the responsibilities for flood protection in these kinds of un-embanked development projects fall beyond the exclusive scope of public authorities. This leads to the development of new flood risk strategies and novel governance arrangements.
First, we present a framework for the analysis of legitimacy. Second, we introduce the three case studies by analysing the governance arrangements for HafenCity, Hamburg, Kalasatama, Helsinki, and Heijplaat, Rotterdam, in terms of the division of responsibilities between the involved public and private actors. The selected cases reflect differences in the public-private divide: Helsinki and Hamburg show a clear split in responsibilities between public and private actors, albeit with slightly different degrees of private responsibilities, while Rotterdam is characterized by a considerable degree of joint publicprivate responsibilities facilitated through a public-private partnership. Third, we analyse the legitimacy sources and issues of these governance arrangements and discuss the main differences found, before presenting our conclusions.
Governance arrangements and their associated legitimacy sources and issues
It is crucial for both government and governance to gain legitimacy, but the sources of legitimacy and issues have changed due to the shift of responsibilities to private actors (Behagel and Turnhout 2011; Klijn and Skelcher 2007) . Public hierarchical arrangements centre on the legitimacy of the state that acts for the common good. This conforms to the representative democracy model that generates legitimacy through peoples' equal rights to vote (Bekkers and Edwards 2007) . It relies on indirect representation of interests by representatives chosen by the majority of people for its legitimization (Van Buuren et al. 2012) ; direct involvement of stakeholders may pose a threat to the sovereignty of elected governments and give rise to a blurring of public and private interests (Sørensen 2005) .
Although many scientists agree on private involvement in environmental governance, it is acknowledged that this raises legitimacy concerns (for a literature review, see Lemos and Agrawal 2006) . The bulk of literature that discusses the legitimacy of private involvement in environmental governance focuses on network governance, due to its rising significance in policy practice (e.g. Dellas 2011; Bäckstrand 2006; Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Bogason and Musso 2006; Sørensen 2005) . Network arrangements are built upon policy networks consisting of the public and private interests at stake. In line with participatory and deliberative models of democracy, the procedural characteristics of the decision-making processes are important for the legitimacy of network arrangements (e.g. Sørensen and Torfing 2005) . Acceptance of authority is promoted through the participation of stakeholders (Adger et al. 2009; Paavola 2008) and through an open deliberative process which leaves room for reasoned debate (e.g. Dryzek 2000; Bäckstrand et al. 2010) . Furthermore, participation and deliberation may increase societal support and facilitate implementation (e.g. Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Juhola and Westerhoff 2011) . In the next subsection, we provide a literature review of the different legitimacy sources and issues of network governance vis-a-vis public hierarchical arrangements, from which we have derived our framework for the analysis of legitimacy.
Legitimacy, an analytical framework For our research, we analyse legitimacy according to what governance scholars and political scientists often refer to as input, throughput and output legitimacy (e.g. Papadopoulos 2011) . Input legitimacy relates to inclusive interest representation and is gained through the representation of all interests at stake and through the equality of representation (e.g. Paavola 2008; Bäckstrand 2006; Dingwerth 2007; Bekkers and Edwards 2007; Renn 2006) . In network governance, this interest representation is realized directly by the inclusion of stakeholders in the decision-making process. In public hierarchical arrangements, representation of interests is indirectly achieved by elected representatives whose political decisions reflect the preferences in society, the will of the people (Scharpf 1997; Van Tatenhove 2011, p. 91) , in our case operationalized as the ratification of the key decisions of the governance arrangement by elected representatives. Legitimacy issues regarding direct representation in environmental governance have been widely discussed (for an overview see Few et al. 2008) . A key concern is that representation reflects existing power relations, such that certain elites obtain a dominant voice through their participation in the governance network, leading to procedural and distributive inequities (e.g. Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Bogason and Musso 2006; Sørensen 2005) . For instance, in the case of AFRG, developers and real estate companies may have more means to voice their interests and concerns than the residents who are actually exposed to flood risk (Eakin et al. 2011; Kokx and Spit 2012) . Moreover, short-term economic interests might overshadow long-term non-economic interests such as the safeguarding of flood risk from sea-level rise for present and future generations. The scientific uncertainty related to climate change might reinforce the tendency to base decisions on short-term interests (Few et al. 2008) . Skewing of interests can also occur in the case of indirect interest representation in hierarchical arrangements. Public officials and elected representatives can be influenced by lobby groups. In our case for instance, officials from urban planning might be pressurized by the real estate lobby to speed up the development at the cost of taking long-term precautionary flood measures. For our research, we therefore pay particular attention to representation of the interest of water safety for present and future generations, as potentially being the weakest interest for AFRG vis-à-vis stronger short-term socio-economic interests.
Throughput legitimacy relates to the quality of the rules and procedures to reach decisions, and the fairness of the process (Bekkers and Edwards 2007; Dingwerth 2007 Lidskog and Elander 2010; Adger et al. 2009) . A key concern regarding participation lies in the true nature of stakeholders' influence on decision-making; their voices should count. Public decision-makers might use participatory processes as window dressing to legitimize predetermined outcomes (Few et al. 2008 ), a phenomenon famously described by Arnstein (1969, p. 218) as 'tokenism'. In the case of AFRG, the public authority responsible for flood management might have already decided to raise an existing dike and use deliberative processes to justify this. Harries and Penning-Rowsell (2011) found that public consultation reinforced a traditional engineering approach to flood management because it was biased by a dominant discourse of recent flood victims. A key issue regarding deliberation lies in the stakeholders' ability to understand complex information as well as the rationales behind decision-making, in particular with lay people such as residents (Ebi and Semenza 2008; Renn 2006) . Certainly, this issue seems prevalent in AFRG, a field which presupposes much specialized knowledge and expertise on hydrological and climate models, flood probabilities, risk assessments, technical features of flood measures, etc. This may put residents at a disadvantage due to their inability to deliberate in full and hence to influence decision-making. In our research, we therefore analyse throughput legitimacy by the quality of participation and deliberation, i.e. the extent of influence on the decision-making process, and the open exchange of argumentation, respectively.
In case of output legitimacy, acceptance of authority is gained by the extent to which that authority is effective in achieving goals (Scharpf 1997) , or has the capacity to solve the policy issue (Van Tatenhove 2011, p. 91) . According to Biermann and Gupta (2011, p. 1858) , it is about the 'perceived effectiveness among stakeholders' rather than effectiveness as in the actual solving of the issue. Perceived effectiveness relates to acceptance of the outcomes of the governance process (Bekkers and Edwards 2007) . For our research, we have operationalized this as the stakeholders' acceptance of two major results of AFRG arrangements. The first is the division of responsibilities among public and private actors. This is based on the assumption that private actors must accept the responsibilities for AFRG assigned to them in order for the arrangement to be viewed as legitimate. The second is the actual flood risk and its allocation across stakeholders after implementation of the proposed measures. This is based on the assumption that a high flood risk as well as differences in flood risk allocation among residents might result in a loss of perceived legitimacy of the arrangement. Table 1 shows the framework with which we analysed the input, throughput and output legitimacy, based on indicators to measure the sources of representation, participation, deliberation and stakeholders' acceptance. With these indicators, we scored the three cases relative to each other from high to low.
Responsibilities within arrangements
Since we analyse legitimacy in the light of differences in public and private responsibilities, we now turn to our notion of the concept of responsibilities within governance arrangements. Governance arrangements refer to the organization of tasks between public and private actors. For our research, we characterize governance arrangements along the analytical dimension of the division of responsibilities among public and private actors. We analyse responsibilities instrumentally as the tasks of an actor or organization, and for which it can be held accountable. These responsibilities can be self-initiated, delegated or mandated by law. Responsibilities can be characterized along a continuum from purely public on the one end to purely private on the other end (see e.g. Driessen et al. 2012) . We delineate responsibilities in terms of both width and scope. For the width, we analyse responsibilities through the different stages of the policy process. In line with policy practice, we distinguish between the 'Plan', 'Do', 'Check' and 'Maintenance' stages (see Mees et al. 2012 for an elaboration). 'Plan' represents the planning stage in which one decides what should be achieved. 'Do' concerns strategy development (how targets are achieved) and the actual implementation and financing of adaptation measures. 'Check' is about the monitoring and evaluation of policies. 'Maintenance' is applicable to the daily management situation after policy implementation. This is particularly relevant to AFRG and entails typical roles such as flood risk communication, flood preparedness, flood damage control and recovery. For the scope of responsibilities, we distinguish between (1) exclusive responsibility, meaning that responsibilities are either 100 % public or 100 % private, (2) joint responsibilities, meaning that there is a joint public-private responsibility, and (3) split responsibilities, meaning that there is a clear separation of the same responsibility between the public and private sectors.
Research method
We apply an in-depth comparative case study approach, which enables us to explore and analyse differences in the legitimacy of governance arrangements. HafenCity, Hamburg, Helsinki, Kalasatama, and Heijplaat, Rotterdam, were selected for a number of similarities. They are faced with an increased flood risk from sea-level rise (in Hamburg and Rotterdam, this flood risk is exacerbated by increased discharge levels from the rivers Elbe and Meuse, respectively, while in Helsinki the threat comes solely from the sea). They represent urban regeneration projects that turn former harbour areas into residential areas. They lie adjacent to the city centre and are not protected by structural embankments. All three employ a mix of flood risk strategies. In all three cases, private actors have gained certain responsibilities. However, a key difference of relevance to our evaluation of legitimacy lies in the scope (exclusive, joint or split responsibilities) and width (across the stages of the policy process) of these private responsibilities. In Rotterdam, private involvement is more widespread and enhanced through the creation of a publicprivate partnership. We conducted four expert interviews (three scientists and one consultant) to gain insight into the main issues related to the adaptive flood risk governance of unembanked areas and to scope interesting projects as potential case studies. For the actual case studies, we combined two sources of information. A content analysis of major policy documents and official websites was performed, which provided insight into the formal responsibilities for AFRG. We complemented this with 36 stakeholder interviews with key public and private actors involved in these projects (see Online Resource 1 for an overview of respondents). Respondents were recruited using websites and the snowball technique, and represented various public authorities as well as private stakeholder groups such as investors, architects, residents, NGOs, politicians and housing associations involved in these case studies. The interviews were semi-structured and conducted between April and November 2012 (34 face-to-face interviews and two telephone interviews). The interviews gave a ground-level view of stakeholders' experiences with respect to responsibilities, and they yielded insights into the perceived legitimacy of the arrangements from different stakeholders' perspectives. The perspectives of the respondents did not diverge very much except for some instances of controversy, which are mentioned in the results section. We interpreted the data from these interviews to analyse and compare the extent to which the four legitimacy sources were present in the case studies. Separate reports were made of the three case studies, which contain detailed information about water safety planning cultures, responsibility divisions and the evaluation of legitimacy sources based on the analytical framework of Table 1 (Mees et al. 2013) . These reports were verified by obtaining feedback from key respondents (five respondents per city), before they were used to inform the comparison of the cases.
Characterization of the case studies

Flood risk strategies
Here, we provide a short description of the case studies and their mix of flood risk strategies, before analysing the division of responsibilities resulting from these strategies (an elaborated description can be found in Mees et al. 2013) . Despite the wide endorsement of AFRG among scholars and policymakers, our scoping exercise of European urban regeneration projects revealed that the majority still relies on flood prevention as the sole strategy (in most cases, public authorities require a minimum elevation of building plots). The three case studies selected for this research represent frontrunners in the field of AFRG since they use various flood risk strategies (see Table 2 ). Together, these measures ensure a water safety level in line with the overall norms for the respective cities set by public authorities, with the exception of Heijplaat, Rotterdam, where the norm is co-decided among the stakeholders and partly deviates from the rest of Rotterdam. We will now briefly introduce the three projects.
HafenCity, Hamburg in Germany is claimed to be one of Europe's largest urban regeneration projects with a development time span between 2000 and 2020/2030. The area lies in front of the main dike-line of Hamburg adjacent to the Elbe River. Rather than building a dike around HafenCity, the Hamburg authorities developed a mix of innovative strategies to manage flood risk so as to raise efficiencies. They introduced the so-called 'Warftenkonzept', by building on elevated plots with heights of ?7.5 metres. This corresponds to a similar safety level to that behind the dikes and will soon be upgraded to ?8.30 metres, resulting from new predictions for sea-level rise (Bürgerschaft 2012) . Thus, the area could be developed plot by plot, and development could start straight away. All infrastructures in HafenCity are elevated above street level to allow access by the fire brigade during storm surges. In addition, built-in flood resistance ('Objektschutz') was introduced, i.e. flood protection measures to individual buildings such as flood doors and walls, as well as the institutionalization of 'Flutschutzgemeinschaften' among property owners and residents of particular neighbourhoods in HafenCity (Schaerffer 2012) . These civic communities are responsible for flood preparedness, for timely alert during a flood event and for closing the mobile flood doors.
Kalasatama is one of several former harbour areas in Helsinki, Finland, which is being transformed into a new residential area between 2010 and 2020/2030. Its coastline lies directly on two bays of the Baltic Sea. In order to conform to the water safety norms prescribed by the Finnish Meteorological Institute, the minimum building height for Kalasatama is set at ?3 metres as an overall flood prevention measure. A small district of 40 floating houses will be built in the northern part as a pilot project by 2016. Flood risk management for Kalasatama is thus enacted through a traditional prevention measure (land elevation) and an innovative adaptive measure (floating houses), while flood recovery is promoted through elevation of the whole project site, including streets to evacuate. Following a competition organized by the public authorities, two developers were allowed the exclusive rights to development of the floating district.
Heijplaat, Rotterdam, in the Netherlands is a 'village' created in around 1920 for the employees of a former shipyard in the middle of the harbour area adjacent to the Meuse River. The most deteriorated area of the village has been scheduled for redevelopment between 2012 and 2020, and is also referred to as the 'new village', vis-à-vis the part that is planned to remain as is, and referred to as the 'old village'. The redevelopment is used as a window of opportunity for raising the water safety level. For costefficiency reasons, the complete embankment of Heijplaat as well as the partial elevation of the new village was not viable. Instead, a mix of flood prevention, mitigation and recovery measures has been decided upon. These entail first, the partial elevation of a main boulevard to create a levy of 3.60 metres. This levy will reduce the probability of flooding by a factor 50 for both the new and the old village. Second, the application of adaptive designs to the building plots and buildings should bring the flood probability level of the new village up to parity with the rest of Rotterdam. Risk communication to residents is being introduced as flood preparation and recovery measures.
Responsibility divisions
A summary of responsibility divisions for each project is given in Table 3 . This summary is based on detailed overviews per project, which were derived from the analysis of policy documents and from the feedback of respondents during the interviews. These detailed overviews can be found in Online Resource 2. The analysis shows that in Hamburg and Helsinki, public responsibility is more pronounced than in Rotterdam, both in scope and in width. As can be seen in Table 3 , many responsibilities are exclusively public, in particular in the Plan and Check stages (see rows 1 and 3). Public responsibilities for these two cases stretch across all stages of the policy process. Instances of private responsibilities in Hamburg and Helsinki manifest themselves in the Do and Maintenance stages, and always alongside public responsibilities. Here, responsibilities are clearly delineated between public and private actors (in Hamburg according to public space versus private property; in Helsinki according to the mainland of Kalasatama versus the floating district). Nevertheless, even in these two publicly dominated arrangements, the private sector carries responsibilities for the implementation and financing of measures delegated to them by the public authorities (see Table 3 , row 2), which shifts costs to those directly benefiting from the measures and from Old village below this level living close to the water. This deviates from the traditional collective manner in which flood measures are implemented and financed through taxes. By contrast, in Rotterdam, private involvement is much more pronounced and manifests itself through joint publicprivate responsibilities across most stages of the policy process. The Rotterdam case is more complex due to a multitude of private interests; most land and real estate is owned by a housing association/developer and individual house owners (in Hamburg and Helsinki, land has been acquired by the public authorities prior to development), and the project area has existing residents in the old village (Hamburg and Helsinki had no prior residential functions). A public-private partnership has been formed with all key public and private stakeholders, and this partnership is ratified with a contractual agreement stipulating the responsibilities of each stakeholder.
A striking similarity across the three arrangements is the common private responsibilities for flood damage control and flood recovery in the maintenance stage (see Table 3 , row 4). In HafenCity, Hamburg, this private responsibility also extends to flood preparation. The public authorities developed a special local law to formalize these responsibilities with the owners/residents of buildings through 'Flutschutzgemeinschaften' (HmbGVBI 2002) . In Hamburg, the public authorities have taken on the responsibility for extensive and continuous communication to create and maintain awareness among the residents of HafenCity of their own responsibilities in flood risk governance.
Legitimacy of the governance arrangements
A summary of our analysis of the sources used for gaining input, throughput and output legitimacy, as derived from the interviews, is presented in Table 4 (for an elaborated evaluation, see Mees et al. 2013) .
Regarding input legitimacy, based on the literature review in the 'Legitimacy, an analytical framework' section, we expected a higher level for Rotterdam than for the other two cases due to the direct and inclusive representation of all key stakeholders in the public-private partnership and its decision-making forums. Our analysis, however, indicates similar levels for the three cases based on three findings (see Table 4 , row 1). First, in each case, the non-economic interest of water safety for present and future generations has been seriously taken into account. Securing sufficient levels of water safety appears to be a particularly important consideration of the public actors involved and appears to be most dominant in Hamburg, which suggests a link with higher flood risks (material damage and loss of life). Of the three projects, HafenCity, Hamburg, is most vulnerable to sea and river flooding due to the absence of a storm surge barrier. Second, in each case, key decisions were endorsed and ratified by elected representatives. The classical way of indirect interest representation by elected representatives remains very dominant regardless of differences in the governance arrangements. In Hamburg and Helsinki, key project decisions were ratified by members of parliament and council, respectively. Even in Rotterdam, the major decisions were prepared by the partnership but ratified by the Mayor and Aldermen who have the ultimate GO/NO GO decision-making power. Third, regardless of direct or indirect representation, in each arrangement, there is some indication of skewed representation: in Hamburg due to direct representation of developers during implementation; in Helsinki due to controversies among elected representatives and public officials regarding the sense of urgency; in Rotterdam due to lower levels of water safety for the old village as opposed to the new village and the rest of Rotterdam.
In line with the literature in the 'Legitimacy, an analytical framework' section, Rotterdam has gained a higher level of throughput legitimacy than the other two arrangements due to the high quality of participation and deliberation among the public and private stakeholders of the partnership (see Table 4 , rows 2 and 3). The various stakeholders had ample opportunity to participate and deliberate on a structural basis through the deliberation forums created by the partnership. Regarding participation, the interviews revealed that the public water managers experienced some constraints in the influence they had on decisions regarding the ultimately chosen adaptation measures, in part because they were involved relatively late in the project. Despite their agreement with the chosen adaptation measures, they shared some concerns regarding the awareness and capacity of the residents in actually fulfilling the responsibilities for flood recovery assigned to them. The public-private partnership managed to deal with the limited deliberation competencies of residents by hiring an external consultant to represent the residents of Heijplaat, Rotterdam, in the major decision-making forum (while the residents themselves directly participate in the operational forum that discusses more practical matters). The residents rely on the expertise of this consultant in these deliberations. Compared to Rotterdam, Hamburg and Helsinki show low levels of throughput legitimacy. This corresponds with the dominance of public responsibilities and a hierarchical steering, where responsibility divisions are decided upon by public authorities and responsibilities are delegated to the private sector. In these two cases, consultation happens more on an ad hoc basis (conforming to legal obligations regarding public participation) and with professional stakeholders, rather than the wider public. Nevertheless, in Helsinki, the two developers involved in the floating district are relatively influential in the decisionmaking, but primarily on matters of implementation due to their specific expertise in building floating constructions. Regarding output legitimacy, based on the identified perspectives of the different respondents, we conclude that only minor differences are observed among the cases. The higher level of throughput legitimacy for the Rotterdam case did not lead to higher levels of output legitimacy. Contrary to what is often suggested in literature (e.g. Edelenbos and Klijn 2005) , satisfaction with the policy process did not increase acceptance of its outcomes in Rotterdam. In all three cases, there is considerable acceptance by public and private stakeholders regarding the division of responsibilities, and the extent and allocation of flood risks after implementation of measures (see Table 4 , row 4). Nevertheless, in Rotterdam, some controversy is witnessed through a conflict of interests around divisions of responsibilities and adaptation solutions. The interviews revealed a clash between the interests of efficiency and speed on the one hand (housing association, residents, city development department) and the interest of water safety (public water management) on the other hand. In all three cases, we find it somewhat remarkable that residents and investors simply seem to accept the responsibilities for flood damage control and flood recovery assigned to them. In particular, HafenCity, Hamburg, respondents explain that this stems from the upfront clarity of responsibilities and of the extent of flood risk, and from the repeated communication on these responsibilities and risks. Investors and future residents know this in advance and can make a conscious choice whether or not to accept these if they want to live/invest in HafenCity. In the Rotterdam and Helsinki cases, this acceptance of responsibilities rather seems to reflect the limited awareness and sense of urgency of residents regarding flood risks. In Rotterdam, for instance, many residents are hardly aware that they live in an un-embanked area (De Boer et al. 2012) . Even if they are aware, the residents of Heijplaat, Rotterdam, are more concerned with some pressing socio-economic issues (such as maintaining the local public school and supermarket) than with water safety. This means that there is a chance that a (near) flood event can easily change their perceptions on legitimacy, in particular if these result in different damage levels due to different water safety levels as is the case in Rotterdam (and also in Hamburg in the future). Furthermore, this means that public responsibility is necessary for an open and permanent communication of their responsibilities to the private sector, of the flood risks that private actors might face, and of the actions residents themselves can take to alleviate the flood damage.
Conclusions
Adaptive flood risk governance in the urban context entails the involvement of multiple public and private actors. We argue that an increase in private responsibilities for adaptive flood risk governance alters the way legitimacy is gained and raises new legitimacy issues. Based on our results, we come to several conclusions. First, in these frontrunner cases, we observe a shift from government to governance in a policy sector which is normally dominated by public authorities, even though this shift is less wide and deep in two of the three cases, i.e. Hamburg and Helsinki. For all cases, we find that these private responsibilities are more explicit and pronounced than in traditional flood management.
Second, we have demonstrated that such a shift indeed alters the sources with which legitimacy is gained, but only when private responsibilities become quite dominant. Joint public-private responsibilities throughout most of the policy process, as witnessed in the case of Rotterdam, have led to more participation and deliberation, resulting in a substantially higher level of throughput legitimacy. In the cases of Hamburg and Helsinki, where private responsibilities are relatively small (alongside public responsibilities) and narrow (mainly manifested in the maintenance stage), throughput legitimacy is low. Nevertheless, output legitimacy for these cases is still high, due to a high level of acceptance by stakeholders.
Third, the findings in Rotterdam also demonstrate that network governance does not make obsolete the indirect forms of gaining legitimacy by ratification by elected representatives. This is in line with the sparse empirical literature on the issue of legitimacy in flood risk governance, which describes the coexistence of direct and indirect forms of legitimization, where network governance complements rather than replaces the traditional representative democracy (Van Buuren et al. 2012; Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Hahn 2011) . It even appears that the traditional form still dominates, which resonates with other studies in the Dutch context (Van Buuren et al. 2012; Behagel and Turnhout 2011) . General literature on public policy suggests a similar position. Sørensen (2005, p. 355) suggests that governance networks should be combined with representative democracy to ensure the 'democratic anchorage' of networks.
Fourth, although literature in climate adaptation governance (e.g. Adger et al. 2009; Paavola 2008; Bäckstrand 2006; Juhola and Westerhoff 2011) and adaptive governance (e.g. Folke et al. 2005; Lebel et al. 2006 ) often stresses the importance of participatory and deliberative processes, our results suggest that participatory and deliberative models of democracy do not automatically lead to higher levels of output legitimacy. The Hamburg case shows that legitimacy is gained for hierarchical arrangements under the following conditions: (1) high input legitimacy guaranteed through an extensive process of ratification via elected representatives, (2) clarity of public and private responsibilities, and (3) transparency and continuity in communicating these responsibilities, leading to accountability of both public and private actors (Dingwerth 2007) .
Fifth, in addition to the issue of skewed interest representation which has been thoroughly described in environmental governance literature, our research has revealed another relevant legitimacy issue. Private responsibilities for flood damage control and flood recovery raise the issue of whether citizens (1) have sufficient sense of urgency of what is at stake and (2) have the capacity to take action on flood remediation and flood recovery, and to what extent this might result in differences in flood risk allocation and actual flood damage. Regardless of the type of arrangement, for these private responsibilities to be perceived as legitimate, public authorities need to take on responsibility for flood risk communication on a continuous basis. Public authorities could also play a role in increasing the capacity of more vulnerable citizens/neighbourhoods through, for instance, subsidy programs for adaptive building measures, and/or ensure equal access to insurance programs (in some countries, flood insurance does not currently exist).
As the use of multiple flood risk strategies gradually gains ground and private stakeholder involvement consequently becomes more complex, the issue of legitimacy will gain relevance. In addition to legitimacy, this research has shown the relevance of the issues of accountability regarding private responsibilities for adaptive flood risk governance. This is because we expect that the legitimacy of private responsibilities also depends on whether these responsibilities can be lived up to in practice, and whether and how private actors can be held accountable. Focusing on accountability issues related to the private governance of climate adaptation would provide an interesting future research agenda alongside a further empirical exploration of the legitimacy issue.
